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Internet trafﬁc monitoring is an increasingly challenging task because of the high band-
widths, especially at Internet Service Provider routers and/or Internet backbones. We
propose a parallel implementation of the max-hashing algorithm that enables the detection
of millions of referenced ﬁles by deep packet inspection over high bandwidth connections.
We also propose a method to extract high-entropy signatures from MP4 ﬁles compatible
with the max-hashing algorithm in order to have low false positive rates. The system ﬁrst
computes a set of ﬁngerprints, which are small subsets of the referenced ﬁles a priori
unique and easily identiﬁable. At detection time, the max-hashing algorithm eliminates the
need to reconstruct the ﬂows. A Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) card computes the ﬁn-
gerprints of all the IP packets in parallel and searches for hits in the onboard collection of
ﬁngerprints. Our application, dedicated to the detection of known MP4 video ﬁles, enables
the detection of millions of ﬁngerprints and demonstrates a sustained processing rate of
50 Gbps per card. Furthermore, a null false positive rate was observed for our 28.25 GB
transfer test. The proposed implementation also features the detection of suspect ﬂows
based on IP addresses and ports in order to carry out deeper investigations off line.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
4.0/).Introduction
In 2017, an average of 283 Tb including 914,100 minutes
of video will cross the Internet every second as estimated
by Cisco (2012). While such performance is desirable and
well exploited in most circumstances, it can also serve less
glorious aims. Network supervision becomes more and
more mandatory to prevent data leakage, to block mali-
cious programs and to detect attacks. The forensics domain
is also concerned with the transfer of ﬁles related to illegal
activities such as child pornography, fraud, copyright
infringement and others. All these ﬁelds of applicationca (A. Larbanet),
olymtl.ca (J.P. David).
ier Ltd on behalf of DFRWSinvolve referenced data recognition, a process that is usually
composed of two steps:
1. Collection and reference of sensible data: these data are
used to create a reference database.
2. “Live” analysis: a system collects new data and compares
it to the reference database. Amatchwill raise an alert or
trigger an action.
Detecting referenced data over network connections is
not obvious because the initial content is split into small
packets (usually 500e1500 bytes for Ethernet) and
embedded in various protocols. If the monitoring applica-
tion has access to the initial content, a trivial approach
consists of using standard hash values as ﬁngerprints. As
soon as a new object is present, its hash value is computed
and compared against a set of reference hash values. Such a. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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monitor ﬁle uploads or in a proxy to monitor ﬁle down-
loads. Nevertheless, in general it is not possible to access
the initial content or to reconstruct it for several reasons:
 The transfer must be detected before it is complete (e.g.,
data leakage prevention).
 The bandwidth and/or the required memory may be too
high for real-time rebuilding (e.g. an Internet backbone).
 Not all packets may be available. Networks are usually
interconnected via multiple links and the route taken by
a given packet cannot be known in advance.
 The content may be embedded inside a container.
 The target applications and their protocols may be
unknown.
Many research papers address the problem of detecting
a limited number (thousands) of small signatures, typically
regular expressions (Yu and Becchi (2013)). This paper ad-
dresses the problem of detecting very large numbers (tens
of millions) of large objects, typically image or video ﬁles, in
real time at very high bandwidth. In addition, the proposed
GPU implementation enables the extraction of suspect TCP/
UDP ﬂows in the same trafﬁc. The highly parallel archi-
tecture of GPUs, made of hundreds of processing cores,
perfectly matches the hundreds of IP packets to be pro-
cessed in parallel and independently. Furthermore, the
large and fast memory available in GPU cards enables the
detection of millions of known ﬁles and the extraction of as
many ﬂows within a single card.
The detection approach is founded on the max-hashing
algorithm proposed by David (2013). A 128-bit sliding
window generates 64-bit hash values, fromwhich we only
keep the one that maximizes a given criterion (actually we
keep the highest hash value). Since the signatures are
computed for very small data blocks, the max-hashing al-
gorithm requires that the blocks contain high-entropy data
(ideally unique).
In information theory, the entropy is the average
amount of information, which is usually measured in bits. A
low-entropy data source means that the data are redun-
dant while a high-entropy source means that each symbol
has the same probability to occur, which may be related to
uniqueness as detailed in Section “False positive”. An
important contribution of this paper is the computation of
high-entropy signatures from MP4 ﬁles.
Our results show that a single GPU card is able to pro-
cess up to 63 Gbps. Nevertheless, the PCIe 2.0 link used to
feed the card is a severe bottleneck that limits the global
processing rate to 50 Gbps. State-of-the-art PCIe 3.0 GPU
cards or using two cards should enable the monitoring of
100 GbE connections quite straightforwardly.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion “Related work” describes previous work in the ﬁeld of
known data recognition. Section “The max-hashing algo-
rithm” brieﬂy presents said algorithm, the bedrock of the
present work. Section “Referencing MP4 ﬁles with max-
hashing” presents our proposed method for referencing
MP4 ﬁles. Section “GPU computing” gives some background
about the GPU architecture to allow a good understanding ofthe implementation proposed in Section “Max-hashing with
GPU”. Section “Detecting TCP/UDP ﬂows” presents our
method for the extraction of suspect TCP/UDP ﬂows. Section
“Results” describes some test cases and reports the associ-
ated performance. Section “Discussion” addresses a few
challenges related to the complete system conﬁguration.
Finally, Section “Conclusion” concludes this work and fore-
sees some future contributions.
Related work
Known data recognition
Analyzing, classifying and identifying information for
exponentially growing data sizes and transmission rates
has led to new developments in the ﬁeld of hashing and
ﬁngerprinting. These techniques all share a common
objective: reducing large data sets to short representations
while maintaining the ability to make fast and precise
queries at a later time. MD5 (Message Digest #5) and SHA-1
(Secure Hash Algorithm) are two very common examples of
hashing algorithms that are used in cryptography and fo-
rensics. Many other methods have been developed for
cryptography (Bakhtiari et al., 1995), requiring a strong
non-reversible property, but also in other ﬁelds with
different goals such as simpliﬁed mathematics, easy hard-
ware implementation and others (Knott, 1975). Finger-
printing in the forensics ﬁeld is covered in detail by
Roussev (2009, 2010, 2011).
Hash functions usually take a whole ﬁle as input and
compute a ﬁxed length ﬁngerprint so that one can assume
that two ﬁles with the same ﬁngerprints are likely to be
identical, with a very low probability of a false positive. This
property is mainly used for ﬁle identiﬁcation or authenti-
cation. One can therefore check for changes, updates or
alterations of critical ﬁles by only inspecting their ﬁnger-
prints. On the Internet, large ﬁles to download are usually
accompanied by their hash value. When the download is
complete, the user can compute the ﬁle's hash value and
verify that it is the expected one. A different hash value
means that the ﬁle is corrupted. The same principle is used
when investigators need to examine data found on seized
equipment. It is possible to quickly ﬁlter irrelevant ﬁles
(Chawathe, 2009; National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2003) or to point out sensitive content by
using a library of known hash values. Each ﬁle from the
seized equipment is hashed and a lookup access is made to
the hash value library. If the hash value exists, then the ﬁle
is known and no further processing is required for that ﬁle.
This is even more important for cases that involve huge
amounts of data which can require several months to
process and therefore delay further investigations. To help
speed up such investigations, the National Software
Reference Library, a database maintained by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (2003), regroups a
collection of the ﬁngerprints of popular ﬁles such as oper-
ating systems and widely used software. This is of great
help to reduce the amount of relevant data to analyze.
Hashing whole documents does not give anymeasure of
the difference between two ﬁles since even a single bit ﬂip
Fig. 1. Fingerprints of each window in a data set.
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posed the concept of piecewise hashing, implemented in his
software dcﬂdd (Harbour, 2002) to address this problem.
Data are split into ﬁxed-size segments hashed indepen-
dently. Therefore a single ﬁle is represented by several
ﬁngerprints. When parts of it are corrupted, only the ﬁn-
gerprints of the corrupted segments are modiﬁed. How-
ever, any data deletion or insertion in a ﬁle modiﬁes all the
segments from that point and thus all the corresponding
ﬁngerprints.
Andrew Tridgell faced this issue in proposing a software
calledSpamSumin2002 (Tridgell, 2002). Thepurposewas to
detect spam mails, which usually contain similar but not
identical text, in order to circumvent classic hashing detec-
tion. His method shares some similarities with Rabin's ﬁn-
gerprints (Rabin, 1981), developed in the context of string
matching. The original idea hasmore recently been adapted
to the forensics ﬁeld (Kornblum, 2006) as “Context Triggered
PiecewiseHashing” (CTPH).Adocument is split into segments
whose boundaries are determined by local properties. A
ﬁngerprint is then computed for each segment. Roussev
(2009) details this method, which he names “data ﬁnger-
printing”. Computing severalﬁngerprints foreachdocument
increases the probability of detecting unchanged segments.
More importantly, since theboundaries only dependon local
windows of data, the corresponding segments are still
detected when they are relocated, in the same document or
not.Moregenerally, these techniquesaddress themeasureof
containment and similarity, as deﬁned by Broder (1997).
Notable applications and specialized hardware beneﬁts
Hashing has beenwidely used in network forensics. The
main challenges are usually either to prevent network in-
cidents or to retrace what happened after an incident.
Typical incidents are intrusions and unauthorized accesses
(Zheng, 2010), malicious infections and the transmission of
sensible content (Yoshihama et al., 2010). Since it is usually
not possible to log all the trafﬁc over long periods, ﬁnger-
printing can reduce the storage size while preserving the
ability to retrace incidents. In their survey, Broder and
Mitzenmacher (2004) cover a few application ﬁelds that
use Bloom ﬁlters to summarize and reduce content size and
eventually speed up communications in distributed sys-
tems. This includes packet tracing, payload identiﬁcation
and trafﬁc optimization (Callado et al., 2009).
These approaches are off line and post-attack methods,
but ﬁngerprints can also be used for “live” analysis: mali-
cious software protection (Fechner, 2010) and live network
securing systems (Zheng, 2010), for instance. However,
because of the increasing network bandwidths, monitoring
devices need to handle a growing amount of data. General
Purpose Processors (GPPs) are not powerful enough to
handle such ﬂows, making specialized hardware manda-
tory. FPGAs (Lin et al., 2009), GPUs (Tumeo et al., 2011;
Jamshed et al., 2012) and more recently many-core pro-
cessors (Jiang et al., 2013) are potential targets for such
processing because of their parallel architecture. In addi-
tion to their ease of programming, GPUs are known to offer
signiﬁcant performance gains (Vasiliadis and Ioannidis,
2010) against a GPP implementation.The max-hashing algorithm
Themax-hashing algorithm proposed by David (2013) is
designed for quickly detecting the presence of some known
content when the user can only access its fragments, which
is precisely the context of ﬁle transfers over the Internet. It
is particularly powerful when the reference database is
large since the computation time does not depend on its
size.
Basically, the max-hashing algorithm computes the
hash value of every ﬁxed-size esmallewindow in the data
but only keeps the one with the maximum value. This
maximum value has the useful property of representing
any fragment of the original data containing the related
window. In other words, we can spot some known content
inside an Ethernet stream as soon as the window that
generates the maximum value passes through the packet
analyzer with a single database access per packet.Implementation steps
Either while referencing data or analyzing the live ﬂow,
the system processes the data in three steps: extract data
blocks, compute ﬁngerprints for these data blocks and
ﬁnally access the ﬁngerprint database to store the ﬁnger-
prints or search for a match.
Split data into blocks
At referencing time, a set of high-entropy sub-blocks is
extracted from the content to monitor. Ideally, each sub-
block should be unique to the content so that a local
match also means a global match. Using multiple blocks
actually decreases the false positive probability. During live
detection, the payload is extracted from the IP packets by
removing the low level protocols (typically UDP and TCP).
Compute block ﬁngerprints
Awindow size SW and a hash functionHmust initially be
chosen as constant parameters. Computing the ﬁngerprint
requires hashing all the overlapping windows with H. For a
SB-byte data block, every SW-byte window is hashed,
resulting in SB  SW þ 1 ﬁngerprints from which the algo-
rithm will only keep the maximum one. Fig. 1 shows an
example of every computed ﬁngerprint from an input data
ﬂow. In the proposed implementation, the algorithm
computes 64-bit ﬁngerprints from 128-bit windows. The
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“Fingerprint computation”.
Storing/searching ﬁngerprints
For large reference data sets, DDR3 or GDDR5 memories
are best exploited for burst accesses, which enable very
efﬁcient hash table implementations. We use a 2p-row  c-
column array of ﬁngerprints. The hash function used to
access the hash table is simply the p least signiﬁcant bits of
the ﬁngerprint value. When the algorithm searches for a
match, it keeps the p least signiﬁcant bits andmakes a burst
read of the complete row. The ﬁngerprint is further
compared with each of the c cells in the row.Possible issues
False negative
Considering a document with one ﬁngerprint, splitting
it into packets introduces a probability of cutting the win-
dow producing the maximumvalue ﬁngerprint. In this case
the document would not be detected. Let's consider a
document of SD bytes divided into SP-byte packets. The
ﬁngerprints are computed from a SW-byte window, and the
probability of splitting right inside a given window is the
number of possibly cut windows over the total number of
windows, which can be calculated as follows:
p ¼
ðSW  1Þ








SD  SW þ 1|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Total number of windows
For instance, for a document of 15,000 B, divided into
ten IP packets of 1500 B and using a 16-B window for
ﬁngerprint computation, we get about a 1% chance of not
detecting the document at all.
This probability can be reduced by considering more
than one ﬁngerprint per document. The probability of not
detecting nwindows in different IP packets is pn¼ pn. In the
previous example, the false negative probability with four
ﬁngerprints is less than one in a hundredmillion. However,
this method requires more memory to store the ﬁnger-
prints. For a given memory size, there is a compromise
between the number of documents to detect and the
probability of a false negative that can be tolerated.
False positive
The max-hashing algorithm relies on the fact that small
windows are highly representative of the document. This is
true for high-entropy content only because all the symbols
(i.e., the complete small windows in our context) have the
same probability of occurring and the probability of
receiving a given symbol is 2H, where H is the entropy (in
bits) of the small windows. Since we compute N-bit hash
values, we need H to be greater or equal to N to ensure a
maximum entropy for the signatures. For N large enough,
the entropy becomes related to uniqueness. For instance,
with H ¼ 64, the probability of randomly receiving a given
symbol is 264 ¼ 5.4  1020.The referencing step thus requires great care to select
high-entropy regions in a given document, which is not
always possible in the general case. However, large docu-
ments usually contain regions with compressed informa-
tion, which intrinsically have high-entropy. These regions
are good candidates for extracting the maximum value
ﬁngerprints. We present our method for the selection of
high-entropy ﬁngerprints from MP4 video ﬁles in section
“Referencing original ﬁngerprints from video ﬁles”.
Optimizations
The best way to reduce the false detection rates (posi-
tive and negative) is to increase the number of ﬁngerprints
at reference time. This can be achieved in two ways:
increasing the number of blocks in the content and/or using
multiple hash functions. Since we do not have any control
over the number of high-entropy blocks in the given con-
tent, it is relevant to use multiple hash functions. Never-
theless, we also desire to minimize the computation effort
to maximize the processing rate.
In the proposed implementation of the max-hashing
algorithm, we ﬁrst use a common hash function. Then we
derive four variants by just applying a XOR to the hash
value with well-chosen constants Ci. In this way, the extra
computation required to implement four hash functions
instead of one is negligible. However, at detection time,
four accesses to the database of reference ﬁngerprints are
now required instead of a single one.
Referencing MP4 ﬁles with max-hashing
The ﬁle referencing process can be improved by closely
studying ﬁle formats. As described byGarﬁnkel et al. (2010),
a dedicated approach must be adopted for each ﬁle format
to be able to compute unique ﬁngerprints. A quick overview
of the standard video ﬁle format speciﬁcation (ISO/IEC
14496-14 for MP4; ISO/IEC 14496-10 for H.264) and our
own results presented in Section “Max-hashing the whole
ﬁle” support the need for a speciﬁc ﬁngerprinting method
for MP4 video ﬁles using the H.264 encoder.
We propose to ﬁrst identify high-entropy blocks in
reference ﬁles based on their format. We focus on the
Macro-block level of H.264 since data is compressed at such
a level using CABAC or CAVLC algorithms. Furthermore,
Macro-blocks describe the appearance of the video and are
consequently unique to each ﬁle.
We modiﬁed the free and open-source software Ffmpeg
and the included libavcodec library to extract the location of
the high-entropy blocks in such video ﬁles. The modiﬁed
application enables reading a video ﬁle and retrieving the
position of any processed byte during the decoding stages
of an MP4 (H.264) video ﬁle. At the end of the reading step,
the application returns all the indexes and sizes of the high-
entropy blocks.
Nevertheless, we cannot directly extract high-entropy
blocks and apply the max-hashing algorithm to the
blocks because of potential side effects. Actually, if a low-
entropy block nearby a high-entropy block generates a
maximum hash value higher than the one generated by the
high-entropy block, there is a risk of a false negative if both
A. Larbanet et al. / Digital Investigation 14 (2015) S85eS94 S89blocks are present in the same IP packet. So, we apply the
max-hashing algorithm to the whole ﬁle and we only keep
the local maxima belonging to high-entropy blocks. This is
an important contribution of the proposed method which
leads to the impressive results presented in Section
“Focusing on high-entropy blocks”.
GPU computing
General-Purpose computation on Graphics Processing
Units (GPGPU) consists of exploiting the high parallel
computing power of GPUs to perform tasks in different
contexts. Such applications have become so efﬁcient that
GPU manufacturers have modiﬁed the architecture of their
processors to also best ﬁt GPGPU. This section summarizes
the main characteristics of a GPU as a basis for section
“Max-hashing with GPU”.
A GPU implements data level parallelism thanks to a
SIMD (Single Instruction Multiple Data) architecture. The
same instruction is performed on different data at the
same time. Nowadays, these processors can launch
several hundred processes in parallel. GPUs allow fast
context switches to hide the latency of the external
memory. Such an architecture becomes relevant as soon
as an application applies the same sequence of operations
on large data sets (as it is usually the case in graphics
processing).
The vocabulary used in this section is the one proposed
by NVIDIA in the description of the “CUDA” architecture
(NVIDIA, 2013), the foundation of all their most recent
processors.Threads
Processing data on a GPU consists of running several
occurrences of a function, called a “kernel”, in parallel. A
kernel usually takes an array of pointers as input and
output arguments. Each instance of the launched function
processes its own index in the array. In our work, we wrote
the source code in CUDA C, which is developed by NVIDIA.
Kernels can only access the onboard memory, except some
special sharing manipulations available on the most recent
processors. The interoperability between the GPU and the
mainstream processor requires dedicated data transfers
between their memories.
Software
Threads are organized in a three-level hierarchy, as
illustrated in Fig. 2. The designer actually launches a “grid”,
which is a set of “blocks”, themselves composed ofFig. 2. Thread organization in NVIDIA CUDA architecture.“threads” that all execute the same function. The processor
is generally more efﬁcient when there is no divergence
between threads. Indeed, when processing a conditional
branch instruction, the GPU splits the threads and runs
them in two stages: ﬁrst all the threads that branch run
together, then the threads that do not branch. The advan-
tages of the parallel architecture of GPUs are quickly lost in
such cases because the numerous threads launched for
parallel work are actually run serially.
Hardware
On chip, processing units are grouped in “multiproces-
sors”. When a grid is launched, the scheduler maps the
different blocks to the GPU's multiprocessors, so that each
multiprocessor runs a block (Fig. 2).
Multiprocessors are independent from each other.
Blocks running in different multiprocessors can come from
different launches and belong to different grids. The NVI-
DIA K20c is composed of 13 multiprocessors, each running
32 threads at the same time. The group of currently
running threads in a multiprocessor is called a “warp”.
Recent NVIDIA GPUs can process several grids and
several PCIe transfers at the same time. This ability can be
used to create pipelined applications and reduce the
transfer penalty.Memory issues
GPUs usually embed their own GDDR memory, called
the “global memory”, which is a very high bandwidth
dedicated memory coupled to L1 and L2 caches. This
memory has a very high latency and is only efﬁcient when
the computing time is larger than this latency (200e400
cycles according to NVIDIA (2013)), which makes caching
and data prefetching of the highest importance.
Moreover, cached global memory accesses are grouped
over a whole warp and aligned on 128-byte segments (the
size of the cache line). The GPU reads 128 bytes in the
memory as soon as required data is not available in caches,
and this is repeated for each thread in the warp. Thorough
implementation is often required to keep data locality and
anticipate further data requests.
Another memory, the “shared memory”, is attached to
each multiprocessor and can be accessed by all the threads
within the mapped block. This memory is the same as the
L1 cache and is very fast to access.
Small and temporary data can be stored in local regis-
ters. Nevertheless, their number is limited and split over a
warp or a block (depending on the processor architecture).
When too many registers are required, the compiler de-
creases the number of concurrent threads. In the worst
cases, the registers are backed up in the “local memory”,
which is a part of the global memory mapped to each
thread. Programmers have to limit their use of registers to
run a maximum of threads at the same time in an efﬁcient
way.
GPU cards are connected to the motherboard through a
bus, typically the PCIe on recent cards. This bus determines
the bandwidth and the latency of all the transfers between
the GPU and the host processor.
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An efﬁcient GPU program involves a few adaptations of
the original max-hashing algorithm to ﬁt such specialized
architecture. Section “Fingerprint computation” details
how the algorithm has been adapted to a GPU and Section
“Storing and searching in a database” addresses the data-
base implementation. Results and performance for both
parts are detailed in Section “Results”.Fingerprint computation
Computing all the hashes requires a signiﬁcant
amount of time and computational power. A rolling hash
function is used to sequentially hash all the windows. It
computes a ﬁngerprint from the previous one in a small
number of operations and keeps the maximum value “on
the ﬂy”. In this way, the rolling hash mechanism just
computes the contribution of the incoming byte and
removes the contribution of the outgoing byte. More de-
tails about this mechanism are given in the work of David
(2013). In the present implementation, the byte contri-
butions are added and removed by the mean of a XOR
function.
We compute 64-bit ﬁngerprints from 128-bit win-
dows. As current GPUs do not contain 64-bit integer ALU,
computing two 32-bit hashes, hhi and hlo, instead of a
single 64-bit one appears to be more efﬁcient for these
processors. In the following, “ﬁngerprint” refers to the
concatenation of these two 32-bit hashes. The byte
contributions are computed through two functions, fhi
and flo. They use two 32-bit parameters, phi and plo, so
that:
fhiðxÞ ¼ x phi ; f loðxÞ ¼ x plo












These operations only require 32-bit rotates (0),
multiplications and exclusive-or. The algorithm keeps the
hash only when it is bigger than the current maximum
(initially set to zero). To compute several hash functions Hi,
we simply compute an exclusive-or between the hash
values and predeﬁned constants Ci (1i4). The results of
this implementation are presented in Section “Fingerprint
computation”.Storing and searching in a database
The database implementation is a straightforward
adaptation of the hash table method described in Section
“Storing/searching ﬁngerprints” with a 2p-row  c-column
array of ﬁngerprints. Two basic operations are required:
storing and searching. They are both implemented as in-
dependent kernels.Storing
Each thread is dedicated to a single ﬁngerprint and
sequentially reads the c1 cells in the selected line and stops
at the ﬁrst zero value (empty cell). The value of the
ﬁngerprint is written there, as well as the reference loca-
tion in the corresponding database. Read and replace ac-
cesses are executed as a single atomic operation to prevent
conﬂicts between two different threads that try to access
the same line at the same time. The performance is not
measured here as we focus on the live analysis bandwidth.
Searching
The searching kernel reads the c1 cells in parallel. We
launch one thread per column and per input ﬁngerprint.
Searching for nf ﬁngerprints thus requires a total of nf  c1
threads. This conﬁguration results in a very simple kernel
that only makes one comparison between a reference
ﬁngerprint and a value in the database. Memory accesses
are automatically coalesced and aligned since we read
contiguous 64-bit words in the database. The performance
of the database search operations is presented in Section
“Search in ﬁngerprint database”.
Detecting TCP/UDP ﬂows
The system, as described above, can detect parts of
known ﬁles through an Ethernet connection. Yet, it may be
interesting to identify all the packets transferred between
two given points that already triggered a hit (suspect ﬂow).
This is the purpose of the TCP/UDP ﬂow detection part. A
packet ﬂow is determined by two IP addresses (source and
destination), two port numbers and a transport layer pro-
tocol. In this paper, we focus on IPv4 addresses (32 bits) and
TCP/UDP ports (16 bits). We adopted a similar approach as
for the ﬁngerprint database: the use of a hash table.
The packet header is ﬁrst parsed: IP addresses and TCP/
UDP ports are extracted and stored. A 16-bit index, for the
hash table, is also computed from both IP addresses. We
chose a commutative function (f(@1,@2) ¼ f(@2,@1)) so that
the direction of the packet has no impact.
The hash table is an array of 216-row  c2 ¼ 8 columns.
Each cell contains two IP addresses and two boundaries for
each port (2  32 þ 4  16 ¼ 128 bits). The whole table
requires 8 MB for half a million cells. For each packet, the
previously computed index indicates the row, and every
non-empty cell in this row is tested. If the IP addresses are
identical and the port numbers ﬁt their boundaries, the
CPU is alerted. The performance of the ﬂow detection is
presented in Section “TCP/UDP ﬂow detection”.
Results
The test bench is a Linux server composed of two Intel
Xeon E5-2609 CPUs and an NVIDIA Tesla K20c GPU card
connected to a PCI Express v2.0 16x interface. The GPU
includes 13 multiprocessors with 32-thread warps and
embeds 5 GB of GDDR5 memory. Fig. 3 presents an over-
view of the proposed detection system. The data are ﬁrst
copied into the main memory by the operating system.
Then, they are transferred to the GPGPUmemorywhere the
computation can start, as already detailed.
Fig. 3. Detection system Overview.
Table 2
Test scenarios.
Tests and results Conﬁgurations
Memory transfers Fig. 4 Variable buffer size
DMA to pinned memory
Host to device copy
Compute ﬁngerprints 119.9 Gbps 768 MB of random input data
1536 B blocks




2.09  106 random ﬁngerprints
2p1-row  c1-columns database
p1 ¼ 21
No data transfer
Parse packet headers Fig. 6 Variable number of packets
Packets stored in 1536 B blocks
No data transfer
Search in TCP/UDP ﬂows
database Fig. 7
524,288 random ﬂows
2p2-row  c2-columns Database
p2 ¼ 16
No data transfer
Chained kernels Fig. 8 Variable buffer size
1536 B blocks
4 ﬁngerprints per block
c1 ¼ 16 and c2 ¼ 8
No data transfer
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and 2. We ﬁrst report the performance of the proposed
referencing algorithm. Then the bandwidth of memory
transfers between the host and the GPU are measured
because they will set the upper limit for the detection
system. Finally, the performance of each kernel is measured
independently to later be able to select and build an
optimal conﬁguration for the complete system.Referencing original ﬁngerprints from video ﬁles
We apply the max-hashing algorithm on 8073 MP4
video ﬁles (56.5 GB, 182.4 h) from the CCV database (Jiang
et al., 2011). To measure the impact of our high-entropy
block extractor on the detection results, we consider two
distinct test cases: the basic case where the max-hashing
algorithm is applied on whole ﬁles and the case where
we focus on high-entropy regions as presented in Section
“Referencing MP4 ﬁles with max-hashing”. In both cases,
the ﬁles are split into 128 blocks and 4 ﬁngerprints are
computed for each block. The results are shown in Table 1.
Max-hashing the whole ﬁle
Among the 8073  128  4 ¼ 41,33,376 computed ﬁn-
gerprints, we noticed 371 ﬁngerprints that are common to
at least two ﬁles (243 ﬁles generated at least one redundant
ﬁngerprint). Most of them were computed on ﬁles that
share the same audio track (music sample) and involve only
7 ﬁles. But there are also 14 highly redundant ﬁngerprints
that are common to up to 143 visually unique ﬁles. We
identiﬁed that these highly redundant ﬁngerprints were
computed on MP4 media information headers. Results
show that a basic approach for referencing ﬁles generates
redundant ﬁngerprints and will consequently increase the
probability of wrongfully detecting a ﬁle (false positive).Table 1
Reference ﬁngerprints computation.
Whole ﬁle High-entr. blocks
Total ﬁnger. 4,133,146 4,119,933
Redundant ﬁnger. 371 0
Files with redun. 243 0Focusing on high-entropy blocks
This new approach does not generate any new redun-
dant ﬁngerprints and, as it ﬁlters both audio information
and MP4 headers, the redundancies computed in the pre-
vious section are avoided. The computed ﬁngerprints are all
unique to each ﬁle in our database. The probability of a
mismatch in the database is therefore nulliﬁed.
Memory transfers
Before being accessed and processed by the GPU, data
must be copied into the dedicated memory. The theoretical
data bandwidth of our PCI-Express 2.0 bus is 64 Gbps (16
lanes).We use DirectMemory Access (DMA) to copy a block
of pinned memory to the GPUmemory as this is the fastest
way to transfer data because they cannot be swapped. Re-
sults show an actual sustained transfer rate of up to
50 Gbps, dependent on the transmitted block size, as pre-
sented in Fig. 4. The bandwidth is close to saturation for
buffers as small as 2 MB. The application should therefore
use buffer sizes greater than or equal to 2 MB.
Fingerprint computation
Wemeasured the performance of this kernel by hashing
768 MB of random data. The kernel has to produce four
ﬁngerprints per 1536 B blocks (524,288 blocks). This test
shows a processing rate of 119.9 Gbps, allowing the kernel
to produce 40 million ﬁngerprints per second.
Search in ﬁngerprint database
The implemented ﬁngerprint search function was
launched on 2 million random ﬁngerprints to search in a
2p1-row  c1-columns database (p1 is set to 21, c1 is vari-
able). Opposite conﬁgurations were tested: ﬁrst when no
Fig. 4. Transfer performances. Fig. 6. Parsing headers.
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relevant differences were observable. We can see in Fig. 5
that the hash searching rate varies linearly with 1/c1, an
expected tendency as the total workload is linear with c1.TCP/UDP ﬂow detection
These results refer to the bottom of Fig. 3, as described in
Section “Detecting TCP/UDP ﬂows”.
Parsing headers
This kernel extracts, for each packet, the payload posi-
tion, IP addresses and TCP/UDP ports and computes the
index in the hash table from them. Results are stored in the
GPU memory and are ready to be handled by further ker-
nels. Fig. 6 shows that 400 Mpps (million-packets-per-
second) can be treated. For 64 B packets, which is the
minimal size for a standard Ethernet packet, it represents a
total bandwidth of 204.8 Gbps.
Search in TCP/UDP ﬂow database
Thehash table is an arrayof 2p2 lines and c2 columnswith
p2¼16 and c2 is variable. Each cell contains two IP addresses
and twoboundaries foreachport (232þ416¼128bits).
For each packet, the previously computed index indicates
the line, and every non-empty cell in this line is tested. If the
IP addresses are identical and the port numbers ﬁt their
boundaries, the packet and the positions of the complyingFig. 5. Search in ﬁngerprints database.cells are reported back to the CPU. As with the ﬁngerprint
search kernel (Section “Search in ﬁngerprint database”), the
search rate varies linearly with 1/c2 and reaches 518 Mpps
when c2 ¼ 1, as illustrated in Fig. 7. The performance spikes
are the effect of optimizations provided by NVIDIA's
architecture.
Single-GPU complete system
A single-GPU conﬁguration, where all the kernels run on
the same GPU, is tested here. The performance of the
resulting chain (illustrated in Fig. 3) is measured.
Chained kernels
In this conﬁguration, kernels are launched sequentially
except for theTCP/UDPﬂowsearch. Thisonecanbe launched
after parsing the headers (in parallel with the ﬁngerprint
computation). The data are already stored in the GPU
memory before the launch. They are real packets captured
while transferring referenced ﬁles via FTP. Results are pre-
sented in Fig. 8: the solid blue line is the computing time of
the chained kernels and the dashed red line is the memory
transfer time at 50 Gbps (maximum PCIe 2.0 measured
bandwidth).We achieved amaximum throughput of almost
63 Gbps.
Pipeline setup
An interesting feature of Tesla GPUs is that independent
transfers and computations can overlap, so that theFig. 7. Search in TCP/UDP ﬂows database.
Fig. 8. Chained kernels computing time & minimum transfer time.
Fig. 9. Pipeline transfer and computing.
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packetn is being processed and the results from packetn1
are copied back at the same time. The bandwidth of the
complete pipelined system is therefore limited by its
slowest part, either transfer or computation. A physical
limit already exists on the PCIe bus (measured in Section
“Memory transfers”). These transfers represent the “slow-
est part” because the computations run faster than this
limit as illustrated in Fig. 8. We therefore pipelined the
whole application allowing it to fully exploit the use of the
PCIe bus (z50 Gbps). Fig. 9 is a screenshot of the NVIDIA
proﬁler illustrating the implemented pipeline: streams 8
and 10 are used to sequentially transfer data to the GPU,
parse headers, hash payloads, search for known ﬁnger-
prints and copy back the results to the CPU while streams 9
and 11 can search for TCP/UDP ﬂows in parallel as soon as
possible. We can visually identify the data transfer (Mem-
cpy HtoD) to the GPU as the bottleneck of the system.False positive rate measurement
At the beginning of this section, we measured the
redundancy in the ﬁngerprints when they are generated
from the whole content or when we focus on the high-
entropy blocks as proposed in Section “Referencing MP4
ﬁles with max-hashing”. To further measure the impact of
the high-entropy block extraction, we have split our
reference database into two sets. The ﬁrst set is used to
compute the ﬁngerprints and the second set is used at
detection time. A total of 28.25 GB of data are transferred
via FTP and four ﬁngerprints are computed for each IP
packet, leading to the computation of about 500 M ﬁnger-
prints. Ideally, we should not observe any match since no
reference ﬁle is sent by FTP.
Basic approach, with redundant ﬁngerprints
A total of 18K ﬁngerprints were (wrongly) detected. The
equivalent false positive rate is 3.8/100,000. The real rate isactually a little bit higher because when several hits are
associated with the same redundant ﬁngerprint, a single hit
is reported.
With unique high-entropy ﬁngerprints
Not a single hit has been observed in this conﬁguration.
Discussion
False positive/negative rate reduction
Focusing on high-entropy regions greatly reduces the
false positive rate. If required, taking the neighborhood of a
ﬁngerprint into account may further decrease the false
positive rate as detailed by David (2013). Concerning the
false negative rate induced by the packet segmentation
(Section “False negative”), it can be lowered in the refer-
encing process by increasing the number of ﬁngerprints per
ﬁle.Capturing high bandwidth connection
A limiting factor we observed is the need of multiple
data copies in the main memory. Actually, network card
processors and GPUs both use DMA to copy their data to
and from themainmemory but they cannot share the same
memory space. Multiple intermediate copies of the packets
are performed from the network card to the GPU. The
impact of these multiple copies is not noticeable for a
bandwidth of 10 Gbps or less, but its effect appears at
higher bandwidths. PF_RING and PSIO, for instance,
improve the high-speed capture and enable a full 40 Gbps
transfer as mentioned by Jamshed et al. (2012).Comparison to other methods
Most content-based detection systems rely on feature
extraction that requires access to the whole ﬁle. Such
methods are more robust to small changes than the pro-
posed one, which works at the binary level, but they cannot
be applied if the monitoring application cannot access or
reconstruct the whole ﬁle. Our approach has the advantage
of only requiring access to individual IP packets. Its
simplicity enables real-time processing at bandwidths as
high as the ones used between Internet Service Providers at
the cost of a few GPU cards.
Conclusion
We have proposed an implementation of the max-
hashing algorithm on Graphics Processing Units (GPUs)
and a method to compute high-entropy ﬁngerprints from
MP4 video ﬁles. Known ﬁles are ﬁrst referenced in a
ﬁngerprint database, which is stored in the GPU card's
embedded memory. The proposed method to extract high-
entropy ﬁngerprints led to very good results. In our
experiment, 28.25 GB of data have been transferred by FTP
and no false positives have been observed. Concerning the
false negative rate, it can be lowered as much as desired by
increasing the number of ﬁngerprints computed per ﬁle.
A. Larbanet et al. / Digital Investigation 14 (2015) S85eS94S94Our results show a 63 Gbps processing rate for a single
GPU card with the ability to store more than 32 million
ﬁngerprints and to track half a million TCP/UDP ﬂows.
Nevertheless, the PCI Express 2.0 limits the transfer rate to
about 50 Gbps. The proposed implementation can thus
efﬁciently monitor a 40 Gbps Ethernet streamwith a single
GPU card. Because of the parallelism of the application, a
single PCIe 3.0 GPU card or two PCIe 2.0 GPU cards should
straightforwardly enable the detection at 100 Gbps.
The proposed method has been fully implemented and
tested for MP4 ﬁles. Nevertheless, it can be easily extended
to other formats provided that it is possible to identify
high-entropy blocks. This is typically the case for audio,
image and video ﬁles since most of them contain com-
pressed data blocks. Thus, the proposed system may be
used by forensics investigators at very large scales (up to
Internet backbones) to reliably detect the transfer of very
large sets of referenced audio, image and video ﬁles.
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